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Framing Fracking: Which Frames are Heard in English Planning and Environmental Policy and Practice? 
Chris Hilson* 
Professor, School of Law, University of Reading 
*Email: c.j.hilson@reading.ac.uk.  
Abstract: Fracking in England has been the subject of significant controversy and has sparked not only public 
protest but also an associated framing war with differing social constructions of the technology adopted by 
different sides. This article explores the frames and counter-frames which have been employed by both the anti-
fracking movement and by government and the oil and gas industry. It then considers the way in which the English 
planning and regulatory permitting systems have provided space for these frames within the relevant machinery 
for public participation. The article thus enables one to see which frames have been allowed a voice and which 
have been excluded. 
Keywords: Framing , Fracking , Oil and gas , Participation , Planning , Environmental permitting 
Introduction 
Fracking, or ‘hydraulic fracturing’ is a technique used in the oil and gas industry to gain access to 
deposits which are otherwise difficult or impossible to exploit using conventional drilling methods. 
While it is a technique that has been used globally by the industry over a number of years, both offshore 
and onshore, it is only in the last couple of years that it has attracted significant headlines and 
controversy in the United Kingdom (UK). This attention has arisen because, backed by the UK 
Government, the oil and gas industry has signalled its intention to exploit the UK’s newly assessed and 
apparently substantial onshore shale gas resources. This follows the lead of the United States (US) 
where, in recent years, a sizeable shale industry has grown up and produced, inter alia, significant 
reductions in US energy prices. There are always two sides to a controversy however, and while one side 
looks enviously across the Atlantic at the benefits of the US experience with shale, local communities 
and environmental groups have pointed towards the environmental and climate change downsides 
associated with it. The US  documentary Gasland, which showed flames coming from people’s kitchen 
taps in Colorado, supposedly as a result of fracking for shale, has become particularly emblematic in this 
respect. The relative scale of the onshore industry needed to exploit fully the UK’s shale resources has 
also fed the controversy, as has its likely location: on a relatively small island, the large number of well 
pads needed would represent a step change from the UK’s previous small and largely unnoticed onshore 
operations; and the licence areas lie not just in the industrial North of England, but also in the leafy 
shires of the South, where vocal middle class opposition has been particularly strong.1 
                                                           
1
 Prompting a senior Conservative Peer to argue, controversially, in the House of Lords that fracking should be 
confined to the ‘desolate’ North East of England: Nigel Morris, ‘Former Energy Minister Lord Howell (George 
Osborne’s father-in-law) Says It’s Fine to Frack in ‘Empty, Desolate’ North-east’, The Independent, 30 July 2013, < 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/former-energy-minister-lord-howell-george-osbornes-
fatherinlaw-says-its-fine-to-frack-in-empty-desolate-northeast-8738634.html> accessed 28 Nov 2014. 
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The level and nature of the regulation of the drilling operations associated with fracking has also been a 
thorny issue. US regulation was very much hands-off, with exemptions made from some key 
environmental laws to free up the industry.2 Critics of course claim that this regulatory laxity stored up 
pollution problems which have since inevitably begun to reveal themselves – as evidenced by some of 
the experiences in Gasland and a significant number of lawsuits.3 The UK Government has been at pains 
to emphasise, in contrast, the stringent nature of the UK regulatory controls, while at the same time 
arguing against the need for specialist regulation of the area.4 Environmental groups have typically 
pressed for a regulatory ban on fracking but failing that or a moratorium, for a more fit for purpose 
dedicated regime;5 they have also pointed out the gaps6 or inadequacies7 in the existing framework and 
the catch-up nature of the regulatory response.8 
Like most policy controversies, fracking has found itself the subject of an intense ‘framing’ debate. The 
anti-fracking movement has employed a range of frames as part of its campaigning against the use of 
fracking in shale gas exploration and development and the oil and gas industry and the Government 
have asserted their own counter-frames. Framing involves the social construction and communication of 
reality and is inevitably partial. Just like a picture frame or camera lens, framing is about how people see 
                                                           
2
 eg from the Safe Drinking Water Act – see 
<http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/class2/hydraulicfracturing/wells_hydroreg.cfm> accessed 28 Nov 
2014. 
3
 For a catalogue of the numerous US lawsuits, see Barclay Nicholson, ‘Analysis of Litigation Involving Shale & 
Hydraulic Fracturing’ (Norton Rose Fulbright, June 1, 2014),  
<http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/files/20140101-analysis-of-litigation-involving-shale-hydraulic-fracturing-
104256.pdf> accessed 28 Nov 2014. 
4
 See eg Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), ‘About Shale Gas and Hydraulic Fracturing (Fracking)’ 
(30 July 2013) 6-7, 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/268017/About_shale_gas_and
_hydraulic_fracturing_Dec_2013.pdf> accessed 28 Nov 2014:  ‘The Government takes the safety of the public and 
protection of the environment very seriously. We commissioned the Royal Society to review the scientific and 
engineering evidence on shale gas extraction conducted by the Royal Academy of Engineering and the Royal 
Society. This concluded that “the health, safety and environmental risks associated with hydraulic fracturing (often 
termed ‘fracking’) as a means to extract shale gas can be managed effectively in the UK as long as operational best 
practices are implemented and enforced through regulation.” The Government believes that the regulation is 
robust for exploration, but wants to continue to improve it.’ 
5
 See eg Friends of the Earth (FoE), ‘All That Glitters … Is the Regulation of Unconventional Gas and Oil Exploration 
in England Really ‘Gold Standard’? (June 2014) 6, <http://www.foe.co.uk/sites/default/files/downloads/all-glitters-
critique-fracking-regulation-46660.pdf> accessed 28 Nov 2014. 
6
 See eg Friends of the Earth Scotland (FoES) Hearing Statement in Planning Permission Appeal PPA-240-2032 
(Letham Moss)  <http://www.foe-
scotland.org.uk/sites/files/FoES%20Hearing%20Statement%20to%20DPEA%20re%20PPA-240-2032%20FINAL.pdf> 
accessed 28 Nov 2014). A number of the regulatory gaps in Scotland identified in this FoES submission were 
subsequently acknowledged in the report commissioned by the Scottish Government: Scottish Government, 
‘Independent Expert Scientific Panel Report on Unconventional Oil And Gas’ (July 2014) 60-
61,<http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/0045/00456579.pdf> accessed 28 Nov 2014>. 
7
 See eg FoE (n 5). 
8
 eg FoE brought the need for mining waste and radioactive substance permits to the attention of the Environment 
Agency in relation to Caudrilla’s Balcombe site - see FoE press release, 17 June 2013, 
<http://www.foe.co.uk/resource/press_releases/shale_cuadrilla_must_apply_for_waste_permits_17062013> 
accessed 28 Nov 2014. 
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and represent an issue like fracking; like a frame or lens, it is also a strategic choice about which aspects 
of an issue to focus on and which to exclude. One side’s excluded material will often be the other side’s 
focus. As Entman observes, frames will also typically ‘diagnose, evaluate and prescribe’, with diagnosis 
identifying the issue or problem and its causes, evaluation making moral judgements, and prescription 
suggesting remedies or solutions.9 
From an environmental law perspective, it is interesting to see the extent to which space is allowed for 
different fracking frames to be aired and considered in decision-making by English public authorities on 
planning permission and environmental permitting. Do the planning and environmental permitting 
regimes recognise and legitimate certain types of framing in relation to fracking and not others? Are 
government frames necessarily privileged, as one might perhaps expect given that government controls 
the appropriate policy levers? If, as suggested above, framing is about how an issue is seen and what 
aspects of that issue are focused on, then it worth exploring whether the environmental law 
mechanisms for public participation in relation to fracking embrace all perspectives and selections or 
whether they act as a more selective gatekeeper, allowing consideration of some frames and not others. 
These are questions which this article addresses. 
  
 
Fracking 
Hydraulic fracturing or fracking involves the drilling of vertical and then horizontal wells followed by the 
injection of significant quantities of water and smaller amounts of chemicals into the rock in order to 
release gas which is then extracted. Although fracking is a technique that can in principle be used on 
various types of rocks, in practice it has mainly been used on shale. Shale gas is an example of 
‘unconventional’ gas along with other types such as coal bed methane and underground coal 
gasification; they are so-called not because of the unconventional techniques used (such as fracking) or 
the composition of the gas,10 but because of the hard to reach nature of the geological formations in 
which they are found. ‘Conventional’ gas, in contrast is extracted from easier to reach, typically 
shallower rocks.11 
Although fracking for shale gas has been widely used in the US for a number of years now as part of 
what is sometimes referred to as its ‘shale revolution’, its application in Europe has thus far been 
limited. A number of European states including France12 and Germany13 have placed either bans or 
                                                           
9
 Robert Entman, ‘Framing: Towards Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm’ (1993) 43 J of Communication 51, 52. 
10
 In fact shale gas, coal bed methane and conventional gas share more in common in compositional terms than 
the gas produced via underground coal gasification: see Environment Agency, ‘What is Unconventional Gas?’, 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140328084622/http://www.environment-
agency.gov.uk/business/topics/126689.aspx> accessed 28 Nov 2014. 
11
 ibid. 
12
 See the Conseil Constitutionnel, Decision no. 2013-346 QPC of 11 October 2013, Schuepbach Energy LLC, 
upholding as constitutional arts 1 and 3 of Law no. 2011-835 of 13 July 2011 on the prevention of the exploration 
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moratoria on shale gas exploration and others remain only at the start of the process, with exploration 
wells either planned or in progress but, as yet, with no proven fields at production stage.14 In the UK, 
fracking was carried out by the company Caudrilla at Preese Hall in Lancashire in 2011, but operations 
were halted when an earthquake occurred in the local area and a temporary government moratorium 
was placed on further use of fracking until December 2013.15 However fracking really only attracted 
significant media and public attention in the summer of 2013 when Caudrilla’s plans to drill at Balcombe 
in West Sussex led to mass protests at the proposed drill site. Perhaps ironically given that the 
application was to use conventional techniques rather than fracking, but because of Caudrilla’s 
association with fracking and a fear that fracking might subsequently be used on the site, Balcombe lit 
the touch paper for the anti-fracking movement. 
The UK regulation of fracking is overseen by The Office of Unconventional Gas and Oil (OUGO) which sits 
within the Department of Energy and Climate Change’s (DECC) Energy Development Unit – the Unit 
responsible for promoting and overseeing energy development in the UK.16 The overall regulatory 
structure is a complex one. An operator who wishes to drill first requires a Petroleum Exploration and 
Development Licence (PEDL) from DECC under powers, reserved to Westminster,17 in the Petroleum Act 
1998.18 Under the detailed terms of a licence, set out in ‘model clauses’, operators must seek prior 
consent from DECC before a well is drilled.19 Operators intending to use fracking are also required, 
under the licence, to have an outline hydraulic fracture plan reviewed and approved by DECC.20 In 
addition, drilling operations will amount to ‘development’ under planning law21 and will therefore 
require planning permission. Appropriate permits from the relevant environment agencies within the UK 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and exploitation of liquid or gas hydrocarbon mines by hydraulic fracking and revoking exclusive licences to 
prospect for projects that use this technique with the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. 
13
 Germany’s current moratorium is based only on guidelines and the Federal Environment Agency, the UBA, has 
been pressing for these to be transposed into law - see the UBA press release No. 33/, ‘Regulate Fracking Now’, 30 
July 2014; and EurActiv, ‘Germany Moves Closer to Fracking Ban’, 31 July 2014, 
<http://www.euractiv.com/sections/energy/germany-moves-closer-fracking-ban-303808> accessed 28 Nov 2014. 
14
 Richard Anderson, ‘Shale Industry Faces Global Reality Check’, BBC News, 7 April 2014, 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-26735000> accessed 28 Nov 2014; Marek Strzelecki and Brian Swint, 
‘Europe Nears First Commercial Shale Gas Production in Poland’, Bloomberg News, 23 January 2014, 
<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-23/europe-nears-first-commercial-shale-gas-production-in-poland-1-
.html> accessed 28 Nov 2014. 
15
 DECC, ‘Written Ministerial Statement by Edward Davey: Exploration for Shale Gas’ (13 December 
2012)<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/written-ministerial-statement-by-edward-davey-exploration-
for-shale-gas> accessed 28 Nov 2014. 
16
 This dual role has been identified by some as a potential conflict of interest – see eg Energy and Climate Change 
Committee, The Impact of Shale Gas on Energy Markets (HC 2012-13, 785-I) para 43. 
17
 Under the Scotland Act 1998, Sch 5 Pt 2 Section D2(a). 
18
 ss 3-4. 
19
 The Petroleum Licensing (Exploration and Production) (Landward Areas) Regulations 2014, SI 2014/1686, Sch 2, 
para 20. 
20
 See the so-called ‘Regulatory Roadmap’ – DECC, ‘Onshore Oil and Gas Exploration in the UK: Regulation and Best 
Practice (England) (December 2013) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/regulatory-roadmap-
onshore-oil-and-gas-exploration-in-the-uk-regulation-and-best-practice> accessed 28 Nov 2014. 
21
 In England s 55 of The Town and Country Planning Act 1990 and in Scotland s 26(1) of The Town and Country 
Planning (Scotland) Act 1997. 
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will also be required, and well integrity and associated health and safety is controlled via the Health and 
Safety Executive.22 Other permissions may also be required – notably from underground landowners 
whose land lateral wells (which can extend for up to two miles)23 cross. However, although the current 
law does provide a way of overriding landowner objections on access (to go ahead without permission 
or such override rights amounts to trespass), the relevant procedures involve considerable delay. For 
that reason, the Government intends to provide a statutory right of access for drilling operations below 
300 metres.24 
 
Framing 
Fracking is a classic example of what Schön and Rein describe as an ‘intractable policy controversy’ 
which, unlike a policy ‘disagreement’, is incapable of being settled by references to facts and evidence 
alone.25 In a controversy, different parties are likely to focus attention on different facts and, even when 
the same facts are under consideration, they tend to interpret them in different ways.26 According to 
Schön and Rein, this interpretative element, or framing, involves ‘symbolic contests over the social 
meaning of an issue domain, where meaning implies not only what is at issue but also what is to be 
done.’27 Framing, in other words, involves the social construction of reality. Fracking is not just 
something ‘out there’ as a pre-ordained bundle of neutral facts on the ground: it is, rather, an issue 
which invites interpretation – and such interpretation is likely to differ substantially depending on the 
interests of those involved.28 
Although related, frames and arguments should not be conflated.29 According to Hänggli and Kriesi: 
Frames and arguments are not entirely the same. Framing is the process by which political 
actors define the issue for their audience … A frame highlights some aspects of a perceived 
                                                           
22
 The generic framework for health and safety regulation of drilling is set out in the Health and Safety at Work etc 
Act 1974, with specific oil and gas controls contained in the Borehole Sites and Operations Regulations 1995, SI 
1995/2038, and the Offshore Installations and Wells (Design and Construction, etc) Regulations 1996, SI 1996/913 
(which, despite their title, also apply onshore). 
23
 The diameter of the lateral wells is generally around six inches. 
24
 DECC, ‘Underground Drilling Access: Government Response to the Consultation on Proposal for Underground 
Access for the Extraction of Gas, Oil or Geothermal Energy (25 September 2014) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/358521/Government_Respons
e_FINAL.pdf> accessed 28 Nov 2014. Proposed amendments to the Infrastructure Bill have been made to 
implement this – Infrastructure HL Bill (2014-15) cls 38-43.  Most shale fracking wells are around a mile or so below 
the surface – far below 300m. 
25
 Donald Schön and Martin Rein, Frame Reflection: Toward the Resolution of Intractable Policy Controversies 
(Basic Books 1994). 
26
 ibid 4-5. 
27
 ibid 29. 
28
 ibid. 
29
 Regula Hänggli and Hanspeter Kriesi, ‘Frame Construction and Frame Promotion (Strategic Framing Choices)’ 
(2012) 56 American Behavioral Scientist 260, 266. 
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reality and enhances a certain interpretation or evaluation of reality … In this respect, a frame is 
more than an argument because it also provides a specific understanding of the world.30 
Thus, although framing does of course rely on arguments, it is a strategic process whereby certain 
arguments are foregrounded and others are de-emphasised or ignored as part of a deliberate 
interpretive worldview. In addition, frames typically follow a certain formula. This can be seen in Schön 
and Rein’s talk above of not only ‘what is at issue’ but also ‘what is to be done’, in Entman’s mention 
earlier of framing involving diagnosis, evaluation and prescription, and in Benford and Snow’s distinction 
between ‘diagnostic’ and ‘prognostic’ frames (to which they add ‘motivational’ frames).31 All of these 
share the idea that framing is akin to a strategic toolkit which contains different functional elements 
within it. To speak only of arguments would not capture this complexity. 
The anti-fracking movement – which largely consists of a mix of individual activists, environmental 
groups and local residents – is an example of a new social movement. As intimated above by Benford 
and Snow’s ‘motivational’ frames, framing is important to social movements not only because a 
conscious, strategic approach to framing may help to achieve desired social and policy outcomes if the 
battle for meaning can be won, but also because, in creating ‘shared understandings of the world and of 
themselves’, frames may help to ‘legitimate and motivate collective action’.32 Frames are, in other 
words, both a tool for trying to effect change and a recruitment rallying call for social movements. 
Social movement scholars have also emphasised the way in which framing provides a useful 
counterpoint to overly structural approaches which account for social movement emergence and 
activity by reference to concepts such as political and legal opportunity structure.33 Framing, in contrast, 
is very much about movement actors using agency to create and communicate meaning around an 
issue. The question addressed in the current article is, what happens when that active agency comes up 
against structural public participation provision in planning and environmental permitting? Does that 
agency-created meaning and interpretation get properly considered within the prevailing political 
opportunity structure? 
Geographers have also taken an interest in framing, examining, for example, how scalar frames (and 
counter frames) can be employed in particular social movement struggles. Thus Kurtz discusses how 
scale frames were used in the context of an environmental justice dispute over the siting of a 
polyvinylchloride factory in rural Louisiana.34 She shows how framing the issue as one of environmental 
racism took the dispute beyond the local to become one where national focus was appropriate.35 
                                                           
30
 ibid. 
31
 Robert Benford and David Snow, ‘Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment’ 
(2000) 26 Annual Review of Sociology 611. 
32
 Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970 (University of Chicago 
Press 2010) xxi. 
33
 Benford and Snow (n 31) 613. Lisa Vanhala, Making Rights a Reality: Disability Rights Activists and Legal 
Mobilization (CUP 2011). 
34
 Hilda Kurtz, ‘Scale Frames and Counter-scale Frames: Constructing the Problem of Environmental Injustice’ 
(2003) 22 Political Geography 887. 
35
 ibid 906, 912. 
7 
 
Similarly, Bickerstaff and Agyeman describe how the UK Teeside ‘ghost ships’ disposal controversy 
involved a mix of local social and environmental injustice frames and a broader appeal to ‘wider scales 
of regulation and, in particular, a perceived failure of international enforcement of the proximity 
principle.’36 The scale framing of the environmental justice issue also painted local Teeside as the victim 
of environmental harm at the hands of the large and powerful USA.37 While the ghost ships were thus 
framed by campaigners in terms of locally damaging impacts caused by international and national 
injustice,38 the campaign was in the end defeated by counter-scalar frames, whereby the industry 
managed to employ local, regional and national economic development, and global environmental and 
safety frames, to allow the ships to remain (ensuring a viable safe industry in the UK instead of 
unregulated break-up in countries like India).39 Finally, in a law and geography study, Hilson has 
examined the way in which the UK anti-nuclear weapons movement drew upon global legal frames to 
resist locally embedded nuclear sites.40 Although not the sole focus of the current article, scalar framing 
forms a key part of the discussion that follows. 
 
Framing Fracking 
Academic attention has recently turned to how fracking has been framed. In a US context, Wright, for 
example, has examined how frames are constructed within social movement organisations involved in 
anti-fracking campaigning and how they are tailored to specific audiences such as mothers with children, 
faith groups and self-identifying environmentalists.41 In a comparative study of the US and UK, Bomberg 
has looked at the frames adopted in relation to fracking in both countries.42 While she finds a 
considerable degree of overlap, there are also key differences in frame emphasis and resonance which 
she attributes to structural differences such as national approaches to risk and its regulation. Next, in an 
article on framing fracking in Pennsylvania, Hudgins and Poole point to the way in which pro-fracking 
supporters have sought to reframe the ‘problem’ of fracking as one about well integrity rather than 
fracking per se and to stop fracking being used to describe the whole range of operations associated 
with shale drilling rather than just the (technically correct) part involving injection of chemicals under 
pressure.43Also in the US, Sica has explored how scalar frames have been used by those in favour of 
fracking in the US, arguing that ‘a neat stack of scale frames made shale gas seem to benefit everyone’, 
                                                           
36
 Karen Bickerstaff and Julian Agyeman, ‘Assembling Justice Spaces: The Scalar Politics of Environmental Justice in 
North-east England’ (2009) 41 Antipode 781, 791. 
37
 ibid 792. 
38
 ibid. 
39
 ibid 793-8. 
40
 Chris Hilson, ‘Framing the Local and the Global in the Anti-Nuclear Movement: Law and the Politics of Place’ 
(2009) 36 JLS 94. 
41
 Marita Wright, ‘Making it Personal: How Anti-Fracking Organizations Frame Their Messages’ (2013) 24 J of 
Politics and Society 107. 
42
 Elizabeth Bomberg, ‘The Comparative Politics of Fracking: Agenda-Setting, Networks and Framing in the US and 
Europe’, paper delivered at the annual meeting of the UK Political Science Association, 25-27 March 2013, Cardiff, 
UK. 
43
 Anastasia Hudgins and Amanda Poole ‘Framing Fracking: Private Property, Common Resources, and Regimes of 
Governance’ (2014) 21 J of Political Ecology 303, 314-315. 
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encompassing ‘local employment, regional supplies of cheap gas, national energy security, abundant gas 
for tight global markets, and a mitigating strategy for global climate change.’44 Finally, in a science and 
technology studies-based examination of fracking in the North of England, Williams has argued that the 
government and other institutional actors have tended to frame the debate on fracking in technical risk 
terms, which fails to capture wider public frames on fracking which are not associated with risk.45 The 
‘deficit model’ of public engagement, which involves providing the public with more facts on fracking, 
has also been in evidence but, as in other policy areas, is seen as unlikely to assuage the full range of 
public concerns.46 
While the current article shares some common ground with the above emerging literature, it seeks to go 
beyond it in exploring UK fracking frames in more depth and in looking at scalar frames used by both 
sides of the policy debate. It also uniquely turns to examine whether the English planning and regulatory 
systems allow space for each side’s framing to be heard and considered in the decision-making process. 
In the UK, anti-fracking protestors and campaigners have adopted two key types of scalar frames which 
correspond to the concerns they have with fracking and shale gas development. First, there are ‘local’ 
frames which emphasise the local, principally environmental harms which may be caused by fracking.47 
These include: the risk to human health and wildlife from water contamination48 (via ground or surface 
water pollution from fracking fluids, drilling muds or fluids, produced water or methane); risk to 
property from seismic activity and property values from fracking;49 risks to local ecology and 
biodiversity;50 risks to the landscape and local amenity from industrialisation caused by multiple well 
sites;51 risk of local air pollution52 (from, for example, traffic movements and hydrocarbon emissions, 
                                                           
44
 Carlo Sica, ‘Scales over Shale: How Pennsylvania Got Fracked’ (2013) Geography - Theses. Paper 4, 
<http://surface.syr.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=geo_thesis> accessed 28 Nov 2014. 
45
 Laurence Williams, Framing Fracking: Public Responses to Potential Unconventional Fossil Fuel Exploitation in  
the North of England, Durham theses, Durham University, available at Durham E-Theses Online, 
<http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/9444/> accessed 28 Nov 2014. 
46
 ibid. 
47
 <http://frack-off.org.uk/fracking-hell/> accessed 28 Nov 2014; Natalie Hynde, ‘Why We Need an Outright Ban on 
Fracking in the UK, The Guardian CiF, 26 February 2014, 
<http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/feb/26/natalie-hynde-ban-fracking-uk-protest-balcombe>  
accessed 28 November 2014; Veronika Moore and others, ‘Hydraulic Fracturing for Shale Gas in the UK: Examining 
the Evidence for Potential Environmental Impacts’ (RSPB 2014) 
<http://www.rspb.org.uk/Images/shale_gas_report_evidence_tcm9-365779.pdf> accessed 28 November 2014; 
Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) and others, ‘Are We Fit to Frack? Policy Recommendations for a 
Robust Regulatory Framework for The Shale Gas Industry in The UK’ (20 March 2014) 
<http://www.rspb.org.uk/Images/shale_gas_summary_tcm9-365778.pdf> accessed 28 November 2014; World 
Wildlife Fund (WWF), ‘WWF Position on Shale Gas in the EU’ (June 2013) 
<http://awsassets.panda.org/downloads/wwf_shale_gas_position.pdf>  accessed 28 November 2014; 
<http://www.greenpeace.org.uk/climate/fracking> accessed 28 Nov 2014; FoE, ‘Unconventional, Unnecessary and  
Unwanted: Why Fracking for Shale Gas is a Gamble the UK Does Not Need to Take’ (May 2013) 
<http://www.foe.co.uk/page/key-information-fracking-shale-gas> accessed 28 Nov 2014); <http://www.foe-
scotland.org.uk/fracking> (last accessed 7 October). 
48
 See eg RSPB , ‘Are We Fit to Frack?’(n 47) 14. 
49
 eg Hynde (n 47). 
50
 eg RSPB ‘Are We Fit to Frack?’ (n 47) 8-10. 
51
 eg Greenpeace (n 47). 
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including from flaring of waste gas); noise;53 and excessive water consumption affecting local supplies54 
(especially in times of drought). With the above then, fracking is constructed as a local environmental 
problem which carries risks rather than benefits. 
Next, there are ‘global’ frames which rather than focusing on local environmental harm, focus on global 
climate risks posed by shale and other unconventional oil and gas development.55 These include: the risk 
to climate change targets from ‘direct’ greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions associated with fracking56 
(fugitive methane emissions, methane from venting, and CO2 emissions from drill rig diesel generators 
and gas flares), and from ‘indirect’ emissions57 (combustion in heat/power generation and also other 
life-cycle emissions in the supply and disposal chain – for example, water and waste water transport, 
and compressor stations used for gas supply); the risk to climate change targets from diverting 
investment from renewable energy sources (wind, tidal, solar), nuclear power, energy efficiency and 
carbon capture and storage;58 and the need to keep around two thirds of proven fossil fuel reserves in 
the ground to avoid dangerous warming above 2 degrees Celsius.59 With this frame, fracking is again 
constructed as a risk-generating problem, but the risks emphasised are global ones associated with 
climate change.  
At the time of the 2013 protests at Balcombe, when the Green MP Caroline Lucas was arrested for 
allegedly blocking contractor access to the site,60 it was effectively suggested in some media quarters 
that the environmental movement was deliberately prioritising the local scalar frame because it would 
possess greater resonance with the local, predominantly Conservative population in Balcombe, who 
were more likely to be climate sceptics and hence less open to global, climate change framing of the 
problem.61 By focusing on local environmental frames, the environmental movement would be more 
likely to attract the support of ‘NIMBY’62 residents. In terms of the relationship of environmental law and 
climate law, this can be seen as an example of what has been called ‘climate unexceptionalism’, where 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
52
 eg Frack Off (n 47). 
53
 eg RSPB ‘Are We Fit to Frack?’ (n 47) 10. 
54
 eg FoE,  ‘Unconventional, Unnecessary and Unwanted’ (n 47) 8. 
55
 ibid. All of the sources cited at n 47 also give more or less equal attention to climate change.  
56
 eg Hynde (n 47). 
57
 eg FoE, ‘Unconventional, Unnecessary and Unwanted’(n 47) 6-7. 
58
 By keeping fossil fuel prices low, affecting or crowding out the investment market for these other activities. I.e. 
shale will ‘outcompete renewables’ (among others), increasing emissions – eg RSPB ‘Are We Fit to Frack?’ (n 47) 6. 
59
 eg RSPB, ibid 7. 
60
 Fiona Harvey and Peter Walker, ‘Caroline Lucas Among Dozens Arrested in Balcombe Anti-fracking Protest’ The 
Guardian, 19 August 2013, <http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/aug/19/caroline-lucas-arrest-
balcombe-anti-fracking> accessed 28 Nov 2014. 
61
 Matthew Parris, ‘The Left Hides Its Fire Behind a Smokescreen’, The Times, 24 August 2013. Although others 
suggested that fracking might win round climate sceptics, if only to deploy climate arguments instrumentally for 
their own local predicament. 
62
 Itself a scalar frame, discussed further below. 
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there are advantages to framing issues in terms of more local environmental law rather than globally 
focused climate law.63 
While the factual accuracy of this media assertion in the specific case in which it was raised can be called 
into question (because the Green MP Caroline Lucas, who was referred to, used both local and global 
frames in interviews after her arrest),64 it is undoubtedly true to say that having access to two different 
scalar frames with different resonance potential was of benefit to the anti-fracking movement because 
it enabled it to build a broad coalition of support across the political spectrum – with Balcombe in 
particular involving an alliance between broadly Conservative local residents and more radical 
protestors from outside.65 
Besides these ‘negative’ scalar frames, the movement also relied on the creative and at the same time 
playful and hostile use of the language of fracking itself (‘frack off’, ‘get fracked’, ‘frackademics’66) to 
frame the issue in negative terms.67 As Crooks has stated: 
with its euphonious snap and vaguely obscene resonance, it is “fracking” that has captured the 
public imagination, and become a synecdoche for shale production as a whole. Many in the oil 
and gas industry dislike the word, because of its enthusiastic adoption by their opponents in the 
environmental movement. One executive describes it as “hate speech”, and it lends itself all too 
readily to coinages such as “frack off” and “no fracking way”.68 
While not a scalar frame, this use of language can be seen as a key part of what was described above as 
‘motivational’ framing, around which the movement has been able to effectively mobilise. 
 
Fracking was also framed by the anti-fracking movement as an under-researched novel or new 
technology which poses additional risks over existing conventional oil and gas activity. It was thus 
presented as a source of concern that should ideally be subject to a ban or a moratorium.. Failing that, 
the movement argued for a new, dedicated regulatory regime or, at the very least, additional oversight 
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 As opposed to its reverse – climate exceptionalism – where the global climate law frame is preferred over the 
more localised environmental law one: Chris Hilson 'It's All About Climate Change, Stupid! Exploring the 
Relationship Between Environmental Law and Climate Law' (2013) 25 JEL 359. 
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 For video interviews with a global climate frame reference see eg 
<http://www.theguardian.com/environment/video/2013/aug/20/caroline-lucas-protest-fracking-arrest-balcombe-
video>; and <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PVlF4dYp7pM> (both accessed 28 Nov 2014). 
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 Although unusual at first sight, such coalitions are not uncommon in the history of environmental protest – the 
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residents and radical incoming protestors – see further Barbara Bryant, Twyford Down: Roads, Campaigning and 
Environmental Law (E & FN Spon 1996). 
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 Referring to academics whom are said to have close ties with the fracking industry and provide it with beneficial 
research. 
67
 See eg Greenpeace (n 47) (‘It could frack the climate’ … ‘It could frack the countryside, too’) and also the 
extreme energy action network calling itself ‘Frack Off’ (n 47). 
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 Ed Crooks, ‘The Fracking Debate’, Financial Times, 23 May 2014, <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/0d830306-e104-
11e3-b59f-00144feabdc0.html#axzz32QiDjKbm> accessed 28 Nov 2014. 
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and safeguards.69 This can be seen as an example of diagnostic and prognostic framing mentioned 
earlier:70 fracking is diagnosed as a risky novel technology and the prognostic solution put forward is 
either to ban or place a moratorium on it, to have a dedicated regulatory system, or to subject it to 
additional regulatory control (such as exclusion zones around sensitive ecological sites, buffer zones 
between fracking installations and residential or other sensitive sites, or mandatory environmental 
impact assessment (EIA) for all unconventional oil and gas activities).71 
Some media counter-framing has, similarly, been negative. Thus fracking protestors, particularly at 
Balcombe, were either framed as ‘rent-a-mob’ if they were from outside the area,72 or NIMBYs if they 
were local residents opposed to the drilling.73 Both of these are of course scalar frames. They also 
contradict each other. The first is an example of what Kurtz describes as an insider/outsider counter-
scale frame74 and lambasts outsiders for taking an interest in local matters that do not concern them. 
The second, NIMBY frame is similar, except that it belittles locals for seemingly taking an interest only in 
local implications. One suggests it’s a matter for locals only; the other that it’s not just a local matter. 
M uch of the counter framing by government and industry has been positive, emphasising the potential 
benefits of fracking and downplaying the risks. Again, these benefits frames are multi-scalar in nature – 
and indeed arguably more so here as they involve a mix of not only local and global but also the national 
level. First, there has been a national, predominantly economic benefits frame, stressing the number of 
jobs likely to be created by the industry nationally, the tax receipts that would be generated, the 
potential for a reduction in fuel bills, the balance of payments advantages through a decreased reliance 
on imports, and finally energy security.75 Second, we have seen much made of a local economic benefits 
frame, with attention drawn to job creation at local level and also to the economic incentives created 
for local communities to accept fracking wells in their area: industry has promised to pay £100,000 to 
local community for each exploration/appraisal well dug and that communities will further receive 1% of 
                                                           
69
 eg FoE, ‘All That Glitters’(n 5). 
70
 See main text at n 31. 
71
 eg FoE, ‘All That Glitters’ (n 5) 26; RSPB, ‘Are We Fit to Frack?’  (n 47) 16. 
72
 Antonella Lazzeri, ‘The Rent-a-mob, Squatters, Ukulele players and Dale Farm Veterans Hijacking a Village 
Fracking Protest’, <http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/features/5036334/The-rent-a-mob-squatters-and-
dale-farm-veterans-hijacking-a-village-fracking-protest.html> accessed 28 Nov 2014. 
73
 eg Tom Bulford, ‘This Country is Plagued by Nimbys’, MoneyWeek, 30 May 2013, 
<http://moneyweek.com/penny-sleuth-this-country-is-plagued-by-nimbys-64200/> accessed 28 Nov 2014. 
74
 Kurtz (n 34) 909. See also Bickerstaff and Agyeman (n 36) 794, who note the use of this type of frame in the 
ghost ships case. 
75
 eg DECC, ‘Developing Onshore Shale Gas and Oil – Facts about ‘Fracking’ (December 2013)  
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/265972/Developing_Onshore_
Shale_Gas_and_Oil__Facts_about_Fracking_131213.pdf> accessed 28 Nov 2014; David Cameron, ‘We Cannot 
Afford to Miss Out on Shale Gas’, The Telegraph, 11 August 2013, 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/10236664/We-cannot-afford-to-miss-out-on-shale-gas.html> 
accessed 28 Nov 2014; Institute of Directors (IoD), ‘Getting Shale Gas Working’ (2013) 
<http://www.iod.com/influencing/policy-papers/infrastructure/infrastructure-for-business-getting-shale-gas-
working> accessed 28 Nov 2014. 
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revenues (2/3 to local community, 1/3 to county) if the well then goes into production;76 and the 
Government has promised to increase the amount of business rates from fracking sites that local 
authorities can keep from 50% to 100%.77 However, not all the benefits frames are economic in nature – 
there has also been a global climate change frame, pointing to US reductions in GHG emissions after the 
shale ‘revolution’ there brought about via a domestic shift from more expensive coal to cheaper shale 
gas.78 Here, in other words, unlike the anti-fracking movement’s global climate frame which emphasises 
the risks of fracking to climate change, we see a global climate frame which points to potential benefits.  
And while the anti-fracking movement has framed fracking as a novel technology, industry and 
government have instead framed it as an existing technology which, along with onshore and horizontal 
drilling, has been widely and safely used in the industry over a number of years.79 The existing and highly 
productive onshore oil well at Wytch Farm in Dorset, and its proximity to and lack of effect on the 
environment and house prices in Sandbanks, the highest value beachfront housing area in the UK, has 
often been mentioned in this regard.80 Although not shale rock and while predominantly an oil rather 
than gas field, horizontal drilling and fracking have been used on site in this area in the past. This 
emphasis on past experience and continuity is designed to provide reassurance and also to support a 
case for the undesirability (because unnecessary) of additional, let alone dedicated regulatory control. 
Again, analysing this in terms of diagnostic and prognostic framing, one can see that the diagnosis of 
fracking is that it is an existing technology which has been carried out without harm and without much 
notice in the UK in the past, and the prognosis which clearly follows from this is that, as a non-problem, 
it does not require any change to the existing regulatory landscape, let alone a ban. The anti-fracking 
movement vehemently contests such framing, arguing that earlier examples of fracking were on a much 
smaller scale, using much lower volumes of fracking fluid, lower pressure levels and less energy than 
modern ‘high volume’ hydraulic fracturing.81 
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 UK Onshore Operator’s Group (UKOOG), ‘Benefits of Onshore Oil and Gas’, 
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 See the DECC ‘Roadmap’ (n 20). 
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Nov 2014. 
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The Church of England also entered the fracking debate with something of a middle way, sustainability 
frame. While stressing that the Church has no official policy either for or against fracking, the Chair of its 
group on Mission and Public Affairs issued a press release stating that fracking should not be seen just 
through a single (environmental) lens (or frame).82 Rather, it argued, in effect, that sustainability 
requires a three pillared approach, examining social and economic impacts as well as environmental 
ones. For the Church with its concern for poverty and inequality, it was particularly keen that potential 
social benefits, in terms of a reduction in fuel poverty brought about through lower bills that might arise 
from fracking, should not be left out of the equation.83 
 
Consideration of Frames 
The question then is to what extent some of the key frames above are recognised and considered by the 
English land use planning and regulatory permitting systems in their oversight of fracking well 
development and operation. When a planning or permit application is submitted to the relevant body 
(considered further below), what space is there for individuals or groups to have the way they have 
framed the issue of fracking considered within the planning or regulatory process? Or do Government 
and industry constructions of the issue receive privileged treatment so that their frames (eg economic 
benefit) must be taken into account but that others (eg ones which question energy policy choices 
involving fossil fuels) end up being ruled out of consideration in decision-making on planning permission 
and permitting? 
The article is not seeking to prove that particular frames adopted by, for example, the anti-fracking 
movement have caused particular policy outcomes.84 Instead, it is attempting to explore the extent to 
which recent planning policy and regulatory practice on fracking in England allows for or recognises 
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 See ‘Statement from Church of England on Fracking’, 16 August 2013, 
<https://www.churchofengland.org/media-centre/news/2013/08/statement-from-church-of-england-on-
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 Although many, including industry observers, have queried whether unconventional gas will reduce gas prices 
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certain frames in the debate on whether and under what conditions fracking well sites should be given 
the go-ahead in terms of planning permission and regulatory permitting. As will be seen below, a key 
global climate change framing of fracking – which constructs it as a dangerous continuation of an over-
reliance on carbon-based fuels in place of renewables or energy efficiency – is invariably excluded as an 
off-limits argument which cannot be considered by planning authorities in their decisions on fracking 
well sites or by environmental regulators in their permitting decisions on such sites. Such a frame will 
therefore not work within the formalities of the particular procedure – whether planning or regulatory. 
It is not one that these procedures will accept as a legitimate construction of the issue which can be 
considered by the relevant public decision-makers. 
Thus, the article is an examination of whether the anti-fracking movement and its opponents have had 
their respective framing or construction of fracking accepted within planning and regulatory policy. It is 
concerned with which frames are privileged by the planning and regulatory decision-making framework 
and, on the flip side, which frames have been effectively ruled out for from being effectively heard 
within those frameworks. To this extent, the article shares something in common with the existing 
literature on public participation in environmental law. In a recent article, Lee and others, have 
examined the limited scope for meaningful public participation in significant climate infrastructure 
projects involving windfarms and carbon capture and storage (CCS) facilities.85 Those two cases fall 
within the remit of the Planning Act 200886 which provides for ‘development consent’ decisions on 
nationally significant infrastructure projects to be taken centrally by the relevant Secretary of State, 
having first been examined by the Planning Inspectorate. Ultimately, the Secretary of State’s decision 
must be made ‘in accordance with any relevant national policy statement’, with certain defined 
exceptions.87 
In the case of windfarms and CCS, the relevant national policy statements effectively rule out a number 
of key public concerns from being of relevance in decision-making. What this means is that ‘[f]or major 
wind and CCS infrastructure projects … the limitations on what counts as a good reason to challenge 
proposals, leaves very little space for participation.’ In practice, as Lee and others note, ‘[t]here is 
actually likely to be little that participating publics can contribute to the final decision: noise, aesthetics, 
protected sites, alternative sites, concern about the effectiveness and adequate regulation of new 
technologies, are all more or less out of bounds.’88 There are therefore clear parallels with the work of 
Lee and others – both pieces being concerned with what can be considered as part of public 
participation and what is effectively ruled out of bounds. However, the legal context is different in the 
case of fracking. Although the Government consulted on subjecting onshore oil and gas development 
above certain volumes89 to the 2008 regime, it eventually decided to leave it under local democratic 
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 Maria Lee and others, ‘Public Participation and Climate Change Infrastructure’ (2013) 25 JEL 33, 53. 
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 As amended (in particular by the Localism Act 2011).  
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 eg if the Secretary of State is satisfied that the adverse impact of the proposed development would outweigh its 
benefits. 
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 Lee and others (n 85) 60. 
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 Many of the initial applications for planning permission seen in recent years for shale gas drilling would thus not 
in any event have come within the 2008 regime as they have typically been for exploration activities. The 2008 Act 
would only have been applicable later, with applications for production operations.   
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control within the standard planning system described further below.90 The current article is also 
applying a different theoretical perspective (framing) to a different practical problem (fracking, as 
opposed to windfarms and CCS). The lessons learnt from this different perspective have the potential to 
add to our understanding of decision making in respect of controversial infrastructure, whether or not 
such infrastructure falls within the scope of the 2008 Act. 
 
Planning and Regulatory Policy and Practice 
Planning 
Drilling and fracking a new oil or gas well in the UK requires planning permission, and permission is 
required for each phase – exploration, appraisal and production. Applications for planning permission in 
England are made to Mineral Planning Authorities (MPAs).91 Provision is made for public involvement. 
Under the online Planning Practice Guidance (PPG), operators are ‘encouraged’ to carry out pre-
application engagement with the local community.92 (Only in relation to windfarms has pre-application 
community engagement been made compulsory.)93 Members of the UK Onshore Oil and Gas (UKOOG) 
industry trade association have also committed to voluntary pre-application consultation with local 
communities as part of its Community Charter.94 
Once an application has been submitted there will then be further public consultation, involving 
notification and publicity of the application and enabling the public to make representations.95 There 
was some controversy when the Government altered the notification element, removing the 
requirement to notify specific landowners and tenants of the planning application where only 
underground operations are involved.96 Where an environmental impact assessment (EIA) is required,97 
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 PPG, ‘Before Submitting an Application’, Paragraph: 009 Reference ID: 20-009-20140306, 
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 See the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 and the Town and Country Planning (Development Management 
Procedure) (England) Order 2010, SI 2010/2184. 
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 The Town and Country Planning (Development Management Procedure and Section 62A Applications) (England) 
(Amendment No. 2) Order 2013, SI 2013/3194. 
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that has additional consultation and public participation requirements associated with it.98 Even where 
an EIA is not required, an environmental risk assessment (ERA) must be carried out for all shale gas 
operations involving hydraulic fracturing, as a matter of ‘good practice’ imposed by DECC.99 The ERA also 
provides for the participation of stakeholders including local communities ‘as early as practicable’ but in 
any case before applying for planning permission.100 Where an EIA does turn out to be needed, the ERA 
can help to inform this (and the ERA may also be used to inform risk assessments needed for 
environmental permitting).101 
Planning law requires that applications for planning permission must be determined in accordance with 
the development plan, unless material considerations indicate otherwise.102 The relevant development 
plan here will be the Minerals Local Plan.103 There is a wide range of material planning considerations 
which MPAs should take into account. These will include, inter alia, any environmental statement made 
as part of an EIA, an ERA, government planning policy in the shape of the National Planning Policy 
Framework (NPPF) and the Minerals section of the online PPG as well as other relevant government 
policy, for example on energy.104 Public representations which relate to any material planning 
consideration must also be taken into account by the MPA. 
In terms of particular frames on fracking being given space within the planning process, we are 
concerned here with the planning decision-taking stage and any associated ERA and EIA, though of 
course framing will also be relevant during public participation at the plan making stage, as Minerals 
Local Plans are drawn up.105 It is also worth distinguishing between, on the one hand, the ability to raise 
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 Under the Town and Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 2011, SI 2011/1824. If a 
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alternative frames as part of public participation in the ERA/EIA and planning decision-taking process 
and, on the other, whether the legal context allows for them to be considered. In principle all types of 
framing can be aired; but not all types will be taken into account. As will be seen, ERAs/EIAs focus on 
particular issues and Government planning policy limits the ability for certain frames to count as 
material considerations.106  
So which frames will be captured by the EIA process, where one is required by law? Article 3 of the EIA 
Directive 2011/92/EU107 requires consideration of the direct and indirect effects of a project on both the 
local environment and human health, and the global climate.108 Both local and global frames will 
therefore be captured for fracking projects which cross the thresholds for triggering an EIA. An 
examination of a recent EIA submitted by Caudrilla confirms this, with the environment statement 
covering both effects on for example, local water, air quality and biodiversity, and effects on climate 
change.109 Nevertheless, the precise scope of what counts as ‘indirect’ greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
is not entirely clear.110 It clearly refers to offsite carbon impacts such as, for example, the GHG emissions 
associated with the production and transport of diesel used for on-site power generation, or the 
treatment and disposal of waste water. However, it could conceivably also refer to emissions from 
eventual use of production stage shale gas as a fuel in gas fired power stations or for domestic 
heating.111 Because Caudrilla’s application relates to an exploration well rather than a production well, 
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the EIA considers only direct and indirect climate impacts arising from activities relating to the 
exploratory gas extraction process and does not consider GHG emissions from the eventual, hoped for 
production stage, including the final use of gas as a fuel.112 This complies with the Minerals PPG, which 
states that ‘Individual applications for the exploratory phase should be considered on their own merits. 
They should not take account of hypothetical future activities for which consent has not yet been 
sought, since the further appraisal and production phases will be the subject of separate planning 
applications and assessments’.113 (That said, in a separate part, the EIA does in fact seek to justify shale 
gas exploration in the context of renewables and climate change, arguing for a transition role for natural 
gas in the move away from fossil fuels.)114 
While detailed guidance on ERAs is yet to appear, a ministerial statement notes that ‘Licensees will be 
required to carry out a comprehensive high-level assessment of environmental risks, including risks to 
human health, and covering the full cycle of the proposed operations, including well abandonment.’115 
However, as with EIA above, the ‘full cycle’ is actually far from full because the statement goes on to 
observe that: 
The scope of these assessments would naturally be framed by the operations proposed, so that 
prospective future production operations would not be in scope for an assessment drawn up for 
exploration activities.116 
Commenting on this, Williams states that ‘[l]imiting the scope of ERA’s so as to not take into account 
potential future production operations when assessing exploration activities somewhat 
‘compartmentalises’ the issue.117 What it means is that the ERA consultation opportunities, like those for 
EIA, will, certainly at exploration stage, fail to consider global climate frames which involve issues of final 
fuel use. 
Moving on from environmental impact and risk assessments to planning decision-taking, planning 
practice guidance for onshore oil and gas development was initially published in July 2013.118 This 
guidance was subsequently replaced in March 2014 by the ‘Planning for Hydrocarbon Extraction’ part of 
the ‘Minerals’ section of the online PPG. Many local environmental frame issues are ones which can be 
considered by MPAs. Thus, for example, the new guidance states that ‘planning conditions may be 
imposed to prevent run-off of any liquid from the pad, and to control any impact on local amenity (such 
as noise)’, that ‘Mineral planning authorities will … need to consider how issues of noise and visual 
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impact [from venting and flaring] will be addressed’ and that they are ‘responsible for ensuring the wells 
are abandoned and the site is restored.’  Similarly, the ‘storage on-site and the traffic impact of any 
movement of [waste] water’ is stated to be ‘of clear interest to local authorities’.  However, in relation 
to other issues concerning well design, construction, operation, waste and so on which are covered by 
separate regulatory regimes, the guidance states that ‘mineral planning authorities should assume that 
these regimes will operate effectively.’ In other words, planning does not cover every local frame issue 
of concern, but the assumption is that other specialist regulatory regimes will do so. In this respect, the 
position regarding fracking is no different to any other area of environmental law, where cases such as 
Gateshead119 and planning policy guidance (eg the old PPG 23)120 have long policed the relationship 
between planning and pollution control, making sure that each stays on its own territory and that 
unnecessary overlaps are avoided. 
Paragraph 94 of the NPPF allows, in general terms, for consideration of a global climate frame at the 
plan making stage, stating that ‘Local planning authorities should adopt proactive strategies to mitigate 
and adapt to climate change’. However, the specific hydrocarbons PPG then excludes certain aspects of 
that global, climate frame at the decision taking stage. Having posed the question of whether MPAs 
‘need to assess demand for, or consider alternatives to oil and gas resources when determining planning 
applications’, the guidance replies that they ‘should take account of Government energy policy, which 
makes it clear that energy supplies should come from a variety of sources. This includes onshore oil and 
gas, as set out in the Government’s Annual Energy Statement published in October 2013’.121  This clearly 
rules out (at any stage) consideration by MPAs of the ‘eventual use’ type of indirect climate change 
impacts of shale gas adverted to above in discussing EIA/ERA. They have to assume that energy supplies 
from all sources are equally valid and they are not permitted to consider the reduced greenhouse gas 
potential of alternative supplies such as renewables or (‘demand’) of energy efficiency measures. 
One marked difference between the July 2013 PPG and the new online PPG on hydrocarbons lies in 
relation to economic frames. The old guidance provided clear space for pro-fracking economic frames, 
stating that: 
Mineral extraction is essential to local and national economies. As stated in paragraph 144 of 
the National Planning Policy Framework, minerals planning authorities should give great weight 
to the benefits of minerals extraction, including to the economy, when determining planning 
applications.122 
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The new guidance no longer includes this benefits frame (although such a frame remains, in generic 
form, in the minerals section of the main NPPF Document).123 However, it does still speak in terms of 
there being a ‘pressing need’ for exploratory drilling to establish whether there are sufficient 
recoverable quantities of unconventional gas for economically viable full scale production.124 
 
Regulatory Policy and Practice 
The key regulatory system governing fracking in England is the Environmental Permitting regime, 
operated by the Environment Agency. A fracking operator is likely to have to apply for one or more 
regulatory permits under the Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations 2010125 for a 
range of different operations or activities involved.126 Thus for any particular drilling site, a permit may 
be required, inter alia,127 for a mining waste operation,128 a groundwater activity,129 a radioactive 
substances activity,130 and an Industrial Emissions Directive (IED) installation for the incineration of 
hazardous waste.131Under regulation 59, the Agency is obliged132 ‘to prepare and publish a statement of 
its policies for complying with its public participation duties.’  This it has done, in the shape of its ‘Public 
Participation Statement’133 which explains how the public can participate in decisions on applications for 
environmental permits and in the development of rules for standard permits. 
The Statement notes the existence of a policy of increased consultation on applications at sites where 
the Agency considers there is, or is likely to be a ‘high degree of public interest’. This is tailored to 
specific local circumstances but may include one or more of: extending the consultation period; wider 
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advertising; and consulting on the draft permit and decision document (ie in effect, allowing a second 
consultation on the draft decision to issue a permit).134 However, this has not been without controversy, 
with Caudrilla’s Balcombe application apparently not having been classified as of high public interest, 
despite mass public protest, significant police presence, and widespread media coverage.135 
There has also been controversy in relation to the Environment Agency consultation on applying 
‘standard rules’ for onshore oil and gas environmental permits,136 rather than, as at present, issuing 
‘bespoke permits’.137 In consultation terms, while any new standard rules will themselves have been 
consulted upon, they are henceforth an off-the-peg set of rules which can be applied to future permit 
applications without triggering consultation requirements for each of those applications.138 Standard 
rules are aimed at speeding up the regulatory process. However, in part due to pressure from Public 
Health England, it seems that any permit applications involving hydraulic fracturing will still require a 
bespoke permit and that the public will therefore continue to have a right to participate and put across 
their frames in relation to each application.139 
 
The issue of what frames will be acknowledged and heard is slightly different here to the section above 
on planning. There, it was a matter of seeing whether a particular frame had been allowed for or, 
conversely, been effectively excluded from consideration in the EIA (where required) and ERA or by the 
planning policy. Here, in contrast, the environmental permitting rules and the Environment Agency’s 
policy guidance contain either no (environmental permitting) or much less detail (Agency guidance) on 
what types of issues will and won’t be considered as part of public consultation on permits. The 
Participation Statement speaks only of ‘relevant’ information on ‘the potential environmental or human 
health impacts of the activity, in the immediate vicinity or further afield.’ And the draft technical 
guidance on onshore oil and gas merely notes that: ‘Only comments directly relevant to the permit are 
taken into account when determining the application. Other comments will not be considered.’140 But of 
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course, just like planning decisions,141 permitting decisions sit within a general administrative law 
context in which decision makers are expected to take into account relevant considerations and to 
ignore irrelevant ones. In principle, any relevant Agency guidance will clearly be a relevant 
consideration, as will an ERA or EIA; and, in fracking cases and others involving energy, so too may 
government energy and climate policy be one.142 In the end, as will be seen below, if government policy 
documents clearly favour a particular energy choice (gas) and account for this within an overall, up-to-
date climate policy, but this government framing is irreconcilable with alternative social movement 
framing of that energy choice, then the government frames will prove more powerful because they are 
the ones that are likely to be followed by decision makers and upheld by the courts.143 Unlike planning 
above, where government planning policy excludes certain frames, with permitting here, it is the 
positive presence of government policy frames which are a relevant consideration and which will 
typically win over alternative climate framing.144 
 
It is possible to obtain a fuller picture by piecing together from recent permitting decision outcome 
documents what the Agency has considered directly relevant and hence which frames are likely to be 
accepted and which excluded in practice and not just in principle. The decision documents focused on 
are those which involve hydraulic fracking or another form of pressurised well stimulation such as acid 
fracturing145 and which have appeared on the Environment Agency’s online consultation portal.146 The 
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first two – Rathlin Energy (Crawberry Hill)147 and and Rathlin Energy (West Newton)148  – are final 
decision documents and involve mining waste operations and IED installations for the relevant gas 
flares. The other, more recent ones – Caudrilla Bowland (Preston New Road)149 and Caudrilla Elswick 
(Roseacre Wood)150 – are draft decision documents, subject to a further round of public consultation. In 
addition to a mining waste operation and IED flaring installation, these cover groundwater and 
radioactive substances, with the last of these dealt with via separate permits with their own decision 
documents. These relatively limited numbers reflect the fact that application of the environmental 
permitting regime to new onshore drilling activity involving fracking is still in its infancy. 
 
 
A decision outcome document explains how the Agency has considered the application and provides 
reasons for its decision to the public and other interested parties. The emphasis at the start of all of 
these documents is very much on showing how the Agency has taken relevant factors into account in its 
decision making. At the end there is an annex detailing responses to public consultation and the 
Agency’s reasoning on these. It is particularly this latter annex which enables one to see whether 
particular frames have been considered or not, but the earlier parts are also instructive.  
 
It can be seen from all of the decision documents that the Environment Agency will consider many key 
local environmental impacts of concern raised by the public, such as the potential effects of waste 
drilling muds or fluids, produced water and flowback fluids on local groundwater supplies.151 More 
striking is the Agency’s treatment of global climate frames. Here there is a notable difference between 
the earlier final documents and the more recent draft documents. The earlier two take into account 
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issues such as fugitive methane emissions, and the venting and flaring of methane.152 However, although 
these issues are clearly climate related, in these earlier cases the terminology of climate change appears 
to be studiously avoided. In other words, although methane, a key GHG, is discussed, this is done in a 
muted technical manner. There is mention of ‘pollution’153 from the flare, but no inclusion of the more 
politically charged language of climate change.154 
In contrast, the more recent draft decision documents do specifically mention and explicitly address 
global climate change in the context of the flaring installation, where the Agency now obviously (and 
rightly) regards this as a legal obligation under the IED. The documents discuss GHG emissions from CO2 
and methane from the flare, noting the former as being ‘clearly’ a pollutant for the purposes of the IED 
and concluding that flaring is BAT (the best available technique) for the waste gas.155 
 
However, across all of the above documents, it can be seen that the Agency will not consider anything 
considered to be outside the scope of an application for the relevant permit. Hence it will not examine, 
inter alia, indirect global climate change impacts of the final use of using shale gas as a fuel in, for 
example, power generation, which is stated to be a matter of government climate change policy. In all of 
the relevant decisions, the Agency states that comments received in the public consultation relating to 
energy and climate change will not be considered because:  
Policy is made by the Government and the policy on the exploitation of Shale Gas is no different 
to that of any other fossil fuel. The policy states ‘We aim to maximise the economic recovery of 
oil and gas from the UK’s oil and gas reserves, taking full account of environmental, social and 
economic objectives’.156 
In other words, while local environmental frames can be employed by social movement actors within 
the Environment Agency’s permitting consultation process, global climate frames are only partly allowed 
within the process in the shape of submissions regarding direct GHG-related emissions from, for 
example, flaring (though, once received by the Agency, these have until recently been stripped down to 
                                                           
152
 Crawberry Hill (n 147) pp 40-41; West Newton (n 148) pp 40-41. See also Balcombe (n 146) pp 27-28. 
153
 eg West Newton (n 148) p 20. 
154
 Crawberry Hill (n 147) pp 20, 24; West Newton (n 148) pp 20, 24. See also Balcombe (n 146) pp 14, 16, 18 
155
 Preston New Road (n 151) p 57; Roseacre Wood (n 151) p 57. 
156
 Crawberry Hill (n 147); West Newton (n 148); Preston New Road (n 151) p 101; Roseacre Wood (n 151) p 102. 
This wording is used in all four relevant decision documents. None provides a citation reference to the relevant 
government policy. The wording seems to have come from a historical version of the DECC website at 1 
(<http://mycouncil.surreycc.gov.uk/Data/Planning%20and%20Regulatory%20Committee/20111109/Agenda/Item
%207%20-%20Horsehill.pdf> ). Nevertheless, the current UK Annual Energy Statement 2013 (n 121) containing 
government energy policy is very similar in stating: ‘With oil and gas remaining key elements of the energy system 
for years to come (especially for transport and heating), the Government is committed to maximising indigenous 
resources, onshore and offshore, where it is cost-effective and in line with safety and environmental regulations to 
help ensure security of supply’ (para 3.69). Similarly, government policy on shale gas and climate change 
effectively shares the Agency’s approach here in being more concerned with what it calls ‘local emissions’ from 
shale gas operations and not calling into question emissions from shale gas’s ‘final use as a fuel’ – see DECC (n 
142). 
25 
 
a neutral, technical framing, emptied of political weight) and, one assumes, also submissions on indirect 
off-site GHG emissions closely associated with the drilling process. Indirect, ‘final use’ global climate 
frames have not been acknowledged by and incorporated within the process however, because that 
calls into question government energy choices which are regarded as off-limits for the Agency. 
 
Conclusion 
Social movements and their opponents both vie to make their own particular interpretive frames of 
policy controversies the ones that are accepted in public consciousness and public policy. It is therefore 
not surprising to have seen such a framing contest in the context of fracking. On one side we have seen 
the anti-fracking movement emphasising ‘negative’ local environmental and global climate change 
frames, and on the other side there is the Government and oil and gas industry with their range of 
predominantly ‘positive’ economic and climate frames. Having explored these frames and counter-
frames, the current article proceeded to analyse the way in which planning and regulatory regimes 
controlling fracking have made space for some of the key frames to be considered within them. What is 
apparent from the study of the two regimes is that while both local environmental and global climate 
framing of fracking is acknowledged by them, the extent of the acceptance of the global climate frame 
remains limited. Although the regimes accept the relevance of information and argument concerning 
direct and some indirect climate emissions from fracking operations, the relevance of indirect ‘final fuel 
use’ emissions from the production stage appears to be at best unclear and, at worst, completely 
excluded insofar as this might be taken to call into question national government policy choices on 
energy. Because these ultimate policy choices are ones which must be considered as material or 
relevant considerations by MPAs and the Environment Agency, positive government framing of fracking 
inevitably wins through. Also interesting is the under-representation of the key pro-fracking, economic 
benefits frames in the new hydrocarbons planning practice guidance (though such frames remain in the 
generic minerals section of the National Planning Policy Framework, and are also inevitably represented 
in planning practice in planning applications themselves, with economic benefits such as local jobs 
creation having of course long been an important material consideration for planning authorities). While 
one would not expect such economic frames to be present within the Environment Agency’s practice, 
they would be more expected within hydrocarbons planning guidance, and all the more so since the pro-
fracking Government makes such policy.157  
In the end then, the current political opportunity structure, in the form of the planning and 
environmental permitting regimes, is rather resistant to one of the anti-fracking movement’s key global 
climate frames involving fuel choices. It is probably too much to expect political agency on the part of 
the movement to alter the structural or procedural opportunity here (to get final fuel use included as a 
relevant consideration) in the way that Vanhala has suggested can happen with legal opportunity 
structure (ie that movements can help to shape such structure using agency and are not solely 
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determined by it).158 However, it may well be that such agency, in the shape of a repeated putting 
forward of the frame in both formal contexts (where it may continue to be excluded) and informal ones, 
could eventually help to achieve a substantive change in government policy on fracking in a similar way 
to how pressure from the anti-roads movement in the 1970s and 1980s arguably helped to change roads 
policy.159 
In any event, such agency is likely to become much more critical if and when any of the existing 
exploratory operations reach the stage of making applications for planning permission and 
environmental permitting for commercial production. One might argue that, thus far, the relevant public 
authorities have not really been forced fully to confront the issue of GHGs in the final use of gas as a fuel 
because they have been able to kick the can further down the road by claiming that such questions are 
not appropriate for consideration at the exploration stage. However, when the production stage is 
reached, they become much more of a live issue that cannot be ducked in this way. 
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